The book's primary focus is the relentless twenty-one-day fight to Baghdad by the Marines on the right flank and the Army on the left flank. Purdum excels in tying together all the resulting reporting. What emerges is a factual and very human account of the intense ground campaign. Included are events of 23 March, which saw the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company and the devastating losses suffered by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment. The brief campaign also saw some excellent soldiering, such as the feint and race for the Karbala Gap and the "Thunder Run" armored thrusts into central Baghdad. Ever the concise chronicler, Purdum also discusses the northern front that was opened by the airdrop of a thousand paratroopers, and the operations conducted by the British in and around Basra. Purdum weaves all this together in such a way as to make this work an excellent read for military professionals and armchair strategists alike. It is a bit thin on the air and naval aspects of the war, due to the lack of threat posed by the Iraqi air force and navy and because the bulk of the embedded reporters accompanied ground units.
One of the successes of the program, however, was how the reporting brought out the human side of the war. Purdum discusses numerous examples of how the war directly affected such individuals as the U.S. Army officer who, after witnessing the results of an air strike, commented, "It's a helluva thing watching people die," or how an Iraqi man, his hands swollen from recent beatings by Iraqi security forces, emotionally thanked the Americans for saving him.
The book's main strength-its immediacy in telling the whole story of the conflict-is also a major drawback. For years, "one China" has meant two completely different Chinas masquerading as one country-the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (a.k.a. the Republic of China [ROC] ). The PRC is huge, with a population of 1.3 billion, while Taiwan has only twenty-two million people in comparison. There are other differences as well: Taiwan is rich, with a per capita income in 2003 of over $23,000, versus the PRC's per capita $5,000; Taiwan's 5 percent unemployment rate is half, its 1 percent poverty rate is a tenth, and its seventy-seven-year life expectancy is five years more than those of the PRC. More importantly, during the past decade Taiwan adopted a multiparty democracy, while the PRC has only one legal political party that is holding tightly onto its autocratic powers-the Chinese Communist Party. Bush argues that the great powers' (the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) decision at Cairo to return Taiwan to China was the real origin of the "one China" problem, even though cross-strait tensions did not erupt until after the Nationalist retreat from the mainland in 1949. To this day, the PRC takes this World War II decision very seriously. For example, from 21 to 26 July 1995, the PRC marked the fiftieth anniversary of the July 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which confirmed the Cairo Decision, by lobbing "test" missiles off Taiwan's shores.
After World War II, the U.S. government quickly found itself in a dilemma, since it appeared obliged to support the repressive Kuomintang. February 28, 1947, was the beginning of the massacre by the Nationalists, who arrested and killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Taiwanese; it was followed by an era known as the "White Terror." Nationalist repression on Taiwan continued for more than three decades, until 10 December 1979 and the Kaohsiung Incident, which was the turning point in Taiwan's transition to democracy. Following Washington's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1978 (part of America's Cold War strategy aimed at the Soviet Union), Taipei's increasing dependence on Washington for security actually gave the United States greater leverage to sponsor democratic reforms. Thus, quixotically, democratic reforms in Taiwan appear to have been spurred rather than halted by U.S. recognition of the PRC.
It is understandable that Bush, as former head of the American Institute of Taiwan, would want to credit U.S. diplomats and government officials with sponsoring Taiwan's democratic development (one chapter even investigates the impact of the U.S. Congress and Taiwanese-Americans on this process). Granted, this is a subject he knows well; however, lest Taiwanese democracy be mistaken as simply an American knockoff, even Bush is forced to admit that these non-Taiwanese factors "made but a tertiary contribution to the democratization of Taiwan" when compared to the impact of Taiwanese reformers both inside and outside of the Nationalist
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005] (1979) , and the U.S.-PRC communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan (1982) . The commitments included in these four "sacred texts" were not trivial and have created fixed constraints on Washington's and Beijing's behavior. Although necessary to defeat the Soviets, these diplomatic agreements have often worked to the PRC's advantage in putting diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to accept its "one country, two systems" formula.
As for what will happen in the future to this "one China" conundrum, Bush cautions that Taiwan's recent democratic reforms have not given twelve million voting Taiwanese their own seat at the Although recognizing the ambiguities relating to the exact definition of such a "revolution," the book does not get bogged down in the debate, but rather directs its analysis to the sociological, cultural, bureaucratic, intellectual, and other processes by which such revolutions are, or are not, replicated. Military weapons may spread through arms sales, the commercial development of "dual-use" technologies, or by simple imitation, but the military doctrines appropriate to such new kinds of weaponry sometimes do not spread so rapidly.
There are some very stimulating and provocative historical case studies, including the foreign penetrations of the past five centuries into South Asia, the development of "blitzkrieg" armored
